The public stereotype of schizophrenia is characterized by craziness, a split personality, unpredictable and dangerous behaviour, and by the idea of a chronic brain disease.
its replacement by so-called operational diagnostic criteria, ie, by providing checklists of symptoms and other criteria, first in 1980 by the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III (DSM-III), 4 then by the World Health Organization with its Chapter V of the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) in 1992. 5 Newer editions exist (DSM-5 6 ) or are being developed (ICD-11 7 ), but they do not deviate principally from their respective original operational versions.
All my professional life, I have witnessed the despair of patients and their family members when confronted with the diagnosis of schizophrenia. It is perceived as a virtual death sentence in terms of referring to a chronic, deteriorating, and incurable disease, to a "split personality" implying unpredictability, and to craziness symptoms, such as hallucinations and delusions, leading to dangerous behaviour.
Since patients and family members know that everyone is thinking like this, the anticipated negative reaction by the social environment weighs heavily. 8 There is a vast literature on the public stereotype, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] showing that it leads to social rejection and discrimination, causes delay in help-seeking, and can give rise to self-stigmatization. 14 Being aware of the public stereotype, I observed myself and my colleagues,
how we often tended to avoid as long as possible to communicate the diagnosis, knowing that all these elements were either completely wrong (split personality) or only potentially but not necessarily characteristic of the diagnosis of schizophrenia (chronicity; hallucinations and delusions). And I went in search of the roots of these elements in the history of psychiatry and am presenting here a chronicle of some better and some not so well-known aspects, showing where they fit together and where they don't. A publication by Hoenig from 1983 was helpful for carrying out this search. 15 The present paper is not on whether it is justified to conceive of schizophrenia as a disease entity and on the related logical and philosophical implications, 16 and not on how (if at all) it should be defined.
It is also not a paper on the sociological aspects of psychiatry as a profession, and the pressure on professions to build up a specific body of knowledge and skills owned exclusively by its members after a long training period (see the discussion of these aspects in Katschnig 2010 17 ). A few remarks on the profession of psychiatry are nevertheless useful here for better understanding the whole story. That psychiatry had become a medical profession in the 19th century had not only to do with humanistic concerns but certainly also with the high professional status medicine enjoyed in society, not the least because of its scientific successes. The title of Jan Goldstein's treatise "Console and Classify-The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century" 18 neatly captures this dual nature of the origins of psychiatry as a profession. Philippe Pinel, the legendary "liberator" of the mentally ill, was excited by the prospects a hospital provided for research, exclaiming in 1815 19 "What a source of instruction is provided by two hospitals of 100 to 150 patients each! …. What a varied spectacle of fevers or phlegmasias, malign or benign, sometimes highly developed in strong constitutions, sometimes in a slight, almost latent condition, together with all forms and modifications that age, mode of life, seasons, and more or less energetic morale affections can offer."
Not only did psychiatrists attempt to do as their medical colleagues did and define disease categories such as tuberculosis and scarlet fever, but it must also be remembered that all diagnostic systems developed in the first 150 years of psychiatry were based on assessing patients in mental hospitals, which was the dominant source of experience of the influential psychiatrists of that period.
They saw a selection of patients at a stage of their disorder when they were most severely ill and disturbing for society, and this selection may have been different from hospital to hospital or country to country, which might explain some of the contradictory findings and suggestions of the leading psychiatrists of that period. Today, in times of community psychiatry the situation is entirely different, but elements of the old diagnostic concepts are still around.
Throughout the 19th century in many European countries, numerous attempts were made by professional "authorities" to define disease entities and design psychiatric classification systems. None of them found general acceptance in the profession, until, at the end of the century, the German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856 Kraepelin ( -1926 , based on what he regarded as a scientific approach, bound together most of the loose ends into two major mental disorders, the chronic and progressing "dementia praecox" (to become "schizophrenia" soon afterwards), and the remitting "manic depressive insanity". Until today, all professional discussions and controversies have focused on this dichotomy and the "firewall" erected by Kraepelin between them. The chronicity mark of "dementia praecox" became part of the public stereotype, although the concept of a progressing disease entity was challenged by many psychiatrists soon after its promulgation.
The central figure in this challenge was the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1857 Bleuler ( -1939 , who laid the emphasis not on the early age of onset (Kraepelin's adjective "praecox") and not on outcome (which he found to be varied in his patients), but on symptoms, and suggested in 1911 to change the term "dementia praecox" to "schizophrenia". He thought that a neutral new term was useful for denoting the characteristic symptoms of the incoherence of association and affect which he regarded as essential for the diagnosis. Unfortunately, the term was misunderstood later outside psychiatry and became itself a part of the public stereotype. In the 6th edition of his textbook, published in 1899, 25 Kraepelin finally contrasted "Dementia Praecox" with "Manic-Depressive Insanity" (Manisch-Depressives Irresein), based mainly on the observations of a different course of the latter, ie, an episodic course with remission in between the episodes, while "dementia praecox", according to
Kraepelin, was starting early in life and progressing, although at different speeds. By this dichotomy, he put a "firewall" between the two which is still being debated nowadays. As far as "dementia praecox"
is concerned, Kraepelin concluded that "The vast majority of mentally handicapped and semi-handicapped after dementia praecox gradually accumulate in the big mental asylums (Heil-und Pflegeanstalten); indeed, these patients, because they do not die off quickly and often spend their whole lives in the asylum, constitute the bulk of the insane requiring care". 26 At a later stage in his life, Kraepelin conceded that there were also a few cases of complete remission in dementia praecox, but this did not lead him to revise the diagnosis.
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Kurt Schneider, whose decisive influence on the definition of schizophrenia will be discussed below, said much later that Kraepelin's concept of the human person was that of the positivist natural sciences of the 19th century where he looked only from outside on the psychotic person. 27 This assessment corresponds to that of a later scholar of Kreapelin, and his work who pointed out that Kraepelin showed a lack of empathy with his patients (while he cared humanely for their physical well-being). 28 For the subject of the present paper, it is important to note that the "chronicity" aspect is the one issue for which Kraepelin is best remembered. Public beliefs still give a poor prognosis to schizophrenia, 13 in any case, a poorer one than to depression. 29 Today, it is obvious-and Eugen Bleuler 30, 31 pointed this out already a few years after
Kraepelin's seminal publication-that Kraepelin described only one "end" of the spectrum of schizophrenia, the group of patients, whose disorder did not improve and even showed a progressive course.
Today, the common finding of large long-term studies is that only about one third of first episode patients may belong to the "chronic group" and that recovery is not infrequent. [32] [33] [34] [35] It is difficult to come to a definite conclusion though, since the contexts have changed completely over time, with most patients living outside institutions ("hospitalism" and "institutionalism" may have played a big role 100 years ago 36 ), the empirical outcome criteria studied being wideranging (covering not only symptoms but also functioning and disabilities), and new treatments having become available.
Kraepelin's concept of Dementia praecox was soon criticized, first for its chronicity criterion, which was suggested to be overrated, and, second, for neglecting psychopathological theory and presenting only an "unstructured mosaic of symptoms". 37 What was neglected by
Kraepelin became a major concern of Eugen Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, just one year younger than Kraepelin, who had worked in several psychiatric hospitals in Switzerland, before he became director of the "Burghölzli", the psychiatric university hospital of the city of Zürich, in 1898, where he stayed until his retirement in 1927.
Bleuler introduced the term schizophrenia first in 1908. 30 In 1911, the lengthy monograph "Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien" ("Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias") 31 was published. The title was most carefully devised. It politely uses Kraepelin's term "Dementia praecox", linking it to Bleuler's two suggested alternative concepts with the word "or". The alternative concepts are represented, first, by the word "group" and the plural used, suggesting that the disorder has several forms of manifestation (especially concerning the age of onset and the course), and second, by the term "schizophrenias", signalizing Bleuler's focus on psychopathology, actually "rejecting" Kraepelin's concept of "dementia praecox"
and making a complete conceptual U-turn. Taking all these aspects together, it is somewhat understandable that Bleuler has been regarded as an empathic person and that his focus was directed to the more subtle aspects of the psychological functioning of his patients. Put simply, the central pathological feature he described for schizophrenia was the incoherence of psychic functions in the cognitive and affective areas (in the absence of obvious organic brain dysfunction), manifested among others by the loosening of associations, and the term schizophrenia was shorthand for these subtle psychopathological abnormalities. A few other psychiatrists had already made similar observations and had proposed other terms "for replacing dementia praecox" (eg, "dysphrenia" 39 and "intrapsychic ataxia"
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). Bleuler discusses these terms and concludes that no suggestion is better than his own, namely the completely new word schizophrenia, since there would be no danger of misunderstandings.
Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened later.
What became equally important as Bleuler's focus on the incoherence of association and affect, which he called "basic symptoms", was that Bleuler relegated hallucinations and delusions to a subordinate status by classifying them as "accessory symptoms", which he regarded as not relevant for the diagnosis since they could be present or absent.
Other than the word "schizophrenia", Bleuler's basic symptoms did not catch on permanently in psychiatric classification systems.
They are obviously too difficult to assess reliably, and the descriptions of symptoms are often mixed with interpretations which leads to a lack of clarity. 41 What remained from Bleuler, both for the diagnostic systems and for the public stereotype, is the word schizophrenia. By using the old Greek word "phren" for the mind and "schizein" (= to fall into pieces, not only split), Bleuler wanted to express the disintegration and incoherence of psychological functions (thinking, affect) and not the separation into two entities. A couple of decades later, the term became publicly used by the media in the sense of "conflicting nature" and "contradictoriness", and also as a "split personality". 42 And this heavily affects patients in the public stereotype since it is related to unpredictability and dangerousness. 43 It seems though that this component of the stereotype is restricted to the educated segment of the general public. 44 The latter finding is important in practical terms-regulations and laws, which may contain the discrimination of mentally ill persons, are formulated and applied by persons with better education. In a survey in Austria, 12 medical doctors had the highest rate of misunderstanding the term schizophrenia-given the authority of physicians, one can imagine how detrimental this can be for patients and their families.
Psychiatrists are still struggling with communicating the diagnosis to patients and family members and in some places the term has been officially abandoned, such as in Japan, where the original translation of schizophrenia "Seishin Bunretsu Byo" ("mind-split-disease") was replaced by "Togo Shitcho Sho" ("integration disorder"; which is in fact what Eugen Bleuler wanted to express with the term "schizophrenia").
It was subsequently shown that Japanese psychiatrists increased the rate of informing the patient about the diagnosis from 37% to 70%
within three years after the change. 45, 46 Opinions are divided though on the issue of renaming the disorder. At the end of this monograph, I attempt to establish a rank order of psychopathological symptoms, which might also be of interest to psychiatrists.".
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Given the later worldwide relevance of the "First Rank Symptoms" the formulation at the end "which might also be of interest to psychiatrists" is especially remarkable. Kurt Schneider was an unassuming man. In the year 1950, when his book "Clinical psychopathology" (containing the "First Rank Symptoms") was published in its third edition, ).
Reliability over validity! Something must ring in the ears of those familiar with the development of the operational diagnostic criteria in the 1980s and afterwards.
| DSM-III AND ICD-10: WHY HAVE HALLUCINATIONS AND DELUSIONS BECOME SO PROMINENT?
Kurt Scheider died in 1968 at the age of 80. In an obituary, it was emphasized that "he was not interested in the short-or long-lived clinical entities which are so popular with psychiatrists". 54 But his "First Rank Symptoms" were exactly used for defining such clinical entities. After a long latency period, delusions and hallucinations received high visibility and considerable attention by their inclusion as the leading symptoms for diagnosing schizophrenia in the operational diagnostic systems. Hallucinations and delusions are equivalent to craziness, representing a complete detachment from "reality" and have become a core component of the public stereotype of schizophrenia.
The introduction of DSM-III in 1980 was dubbed the "NeoKraepelinean revolution" in American psychiatry 55 in the sense that it described discrete psychiatric disease entities and brought psychiatric classification and diagnosis back into medicine, after the preceding editions DSM-I (1952) and DSM-II (1968) had been strongly influenced by psychodynamic thinking. 56 In the operational diagnostic formulation of schizophrenia, the "First Rank Symptoms" of Kurt derive psychiatric diagnoses by using computer algorithms. 68 Schneider's "First Rank Symptoms" became more and more prominent in research on schizophrenia. 69, 70 The straightforwardness of assessing their presence or absence was probably an important reason for their increasing attractiveness-if the patient was reporting them, then schizophrenia was present, and everyone would agree. Gone were Bleuler's basic symptoms-they were very difficult to elicit anyhow and needed a close understanding of the language and the way a patient was thinking, and reliability would be very low. The ). Today, a multitude of efforts are underway to combat the stereotype, by fighting the chronicity prejudice with the recovery concept, 77 the split personality idea with education and renaming the disorder, 45, 78, 79 and the implications of hallucinations and delusions with behavioural interventions. 80, 81 It seems though that the categorical disease concepts of mental disorders are embedded in a hermetic professional system and the term schizophrenia, like other diagnostic labels, will continue to be used without questioning it -in textbooks for educating medical students, in clinical guidelines for practitioners, in research (although it has been shown that the diagnostic algorithms produce heterogeneous groups of patients), in hospital payment systems (although the diagnosis explains only a fraction of the cost variance), and in health statistics. Alternative approaches to using the categorical disease entity "schizophrenia", such as the multidimensional and the person-centred approaches, or the use of a vulnerability stress coping model, can be considered and may in fact be practised by psychiatrists here and there. The question is whether they can be systematically adopted by the profession of psychiatry
given its medical self-definition as well as the fact that, for several other reasons, psychiatry as a profession might face an uncertain future.
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